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The nature of corruption, as well as its causes and consequences, has been explored in many empirical studies over the past four decades (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002) . However, an important new element was added to this literature as a result of the production of quantitative corruption data spanning most countries of the world. These data were initially accessible only from commercial risk assessors. But the subsequent incorporation of this data, as well as data gathered from other sources, into two publicly available corruption indices-Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), published since 1995, and the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index (CCI), available since 1999-greatly expanded access to quantitative data on corruption. And the gradual incorporation of these measures into academic research led to a new quantitative, cross-national literature on corruption (Lambsdorff 2006a , Treisman 2007 ). This paper focuses on the quality of the data used in the corruption literature. It seeks to contribute to an understanding of available measures of corruption through an analysis of key methodological decisions in the production of indicators of corruption, understood here as simple measures that are commonly used to construct indices, and the production of indices of corruption, that is, compound measures that aggregate multiple indicators. In the first section, we focus on indicators of corruption and conduct a simple test to ascertain whether differences in terms of who evaluates a country's level of corruption affect the resulting measures. The result of this test shows that data relying on different classes of indicators, a distinction based on the nature of the evaluator, are systematically associated with higher or lower corruption scores and, moreover, that the differences among classes of indicators also vary across regions of the world.
That is, our analysis shows that current measures of corruption do not provide a basis for ascertaining the level of corruption of countries around the globe with much confidence and also uncovers a rather ominous problem: Indicators of corruption, as a group, fail a basic precept of scientific research, that the results of research-in this case research focused on measurementdo not depend upon who conducts the research.
A standard response to questions regarding the validity of existing indicators of corruption has been that any problems concerning indicators can essentially be sidestepped by combining multiple indicators. Indeed, this has been the argument explicitly made by index developers. Thus, in the second section, we focus on the two main indices of corruption, Transparency International's CPI and the World Bank's CCI, and consider whether these indices overcome the problem revealed in the analysis of indicators. We start by addressing how index developers tackle the choice of indicators to include in their indices. We show that the distribution of indicators is not balanced across the available classes of indicators, both over time and across regions, and that the problem with indicators is thus imported into these indices.
Thereafter, we turn to the choice of aggregation procedure used to construct indices, that is, the manner in which the values of multiple indicators are combined into a single value, and we consider whether the indicator problem is solved at this stage in the index construction through the formal weighting of indicators. We find that, due to the choice of indicators and formal weighting scheme, the CCI and the CPI unjustifiably-and perhaps unwittingly-assign different weights to different classes of indicators and, furthermore, do not use consistent weighting schemes to measure all countries. And we demonstrate how the choice of weighting scheme induces bias in, and undermines the comparability of, the CCI and CPI data. In short, we show how the development of indices has not solved the problem we uncover at the level of indicators.
This analysis of corruption indicators and indices is unique in the sense that we use data on corruption indicators that have not previously been publicly scrutinized. Indeed, though the quantitative, cross-national literature on corruption has used, directly or more commonly indirectly (via indices), dozens of indicators over the past fifteen years, data on indicators-as opposed to indices-of corruption have not been widely available for academic scrutiny. Thus, even though a growing number of publications and papers has addressed the validity of various measures of corruption (Arndt and Oman 2006 , Sampford et al. 2006 , Knack 2007 , 1 these assessments have been largely conceptual and have not presented empirical tests to substantiate their usually critical view of the most-commonly used measures of corruption. In turn, those who have had privileged access to the full range of corruption indicators-the developers of the CPI and the CCI-have failed to appropriately test the validity of their indices or offer a useful assessment of existing indicators of corruption. 2 Thus, this paper presents the first tests using the 1 See also Kurtz and Schrank (2007a, 2007b) . Iqbal and Shah (2008) , Langbein and Knack (2008) , Mehlkop, Graeff, and Neumann (2008) , and Thomas (2010) . 2 The developers of the CPI and the CCI have largely presented the results of tests to defend choices that had been made previously, rather than a way to assess the theory guiding the construction of the index. For example, tests on the robustness of the data to changes in the aggregation rule were apparently performed well after the design of the indices. Though the CPI was released in 1995, the robustness test reported in 1999 seem to have been conducted in response to the appearance of the CCI (Lambsdorff 1999: 18) . In turn, though the World Bank's CCI was introduced in 1999, it appears that it was not until 2006 that a robustness test was conducted (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi full range of data sets used in cross-national corruption research to shed light on the critical issue of the validity of corruption data (on our data, see Appendix 1).
We conclude that the problems with current corruption data are serious enough to call for a change in standard practices. In a nutshell, corruption data suffer from a fundamental problem:
Different data sets used in quantitative research are routinely associated with different findings, and the relative validity of different measures of corruption and hence of the different findings is not readily apparent. Thus, after highlighting the problems with available corruption data, we offer some thoughts about improving the generation of corruption data and their use in the quantitative, cross-national literature on corruption.
I. Classes of Corruption Indicators
The quantitative, cross-national literature on corruption has been made possible by the production of a variety of corruption indicators-simple measures in contrast to compound measures that aggregate multiple indicators. The number of available indicators is high; for the purpose of the empirical analysis in this section, we draw on 23 distinct indicators that cover 210 countries and territories over nine years (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-07) . These indicators have 2006: 25) . Indeed, the results of tests presented by the developers of the CPI and the CCI seem like an afterthought rather than part of an open-ended inquiry about the quality of corruption data. And, most fundamentally, a review of all the methodological papers written by these index developers, starting with the first discussion of the CPI in 1995 and of the CCI in 1999, shows that the tests that were performed are quite weak, frequently confusing the concepts of validity and reliability. Index developers have reported correlations among individual sources of data on the indicators that serve as underlying sources for their indices (Transparency International and Lambsdorff 1997: 11-12; Lambsdorff 2006c Lambsdorff : 8, 2007 Mastruzzi 1999: 31, 2006: 42) . But they have not capitalized on the opportunity to apply standard methods to detect the presence of bias, and to determine the factors driving any such bias. Rather, inasmuch as tests of a possible evaluator bias have been performed, these tests rely on patently implausible assumptions, such as that one can simply designate a measure as the correct measure of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2004: 273-75) , or on basic mistakes, such as passing a means to estimate reliability for one to address the core matter of validity and relying solely on correlations among indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2006: 20-25, 41; 2007a: 556-57; Lambsdorff 2006b Lambsdorff : 86-87, 2008 .
Likewise, index developers have presented the results of some tests directly pertaining to the construction of indices, such as a test of the independence of sources (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2006: 25-31, 42-44; Lambsdorff 2006c: 6) and of the robustness of indices to changes in aggregation rule (Lambsdorff 1999 : 18, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2006 : 25, 2007c . But the impact of the weights assigned to indicators was tested on an unrepresentative sample and the possible impact of variations in the number of underlying sources was tested in a flawed manner, on a small set of cases selected on the dependent variable and that by design addresses the impact of only a few sources that have a low weight in the index (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005: 12-14, 55-57; 2007d: 20-21, 34; 2008: 22, 35) . In short, though Transparency International and the World Bank have explained in some detail how they constructed their respective indices, the CPI and CCI, they have fallen short of providing a thorough validation of the data on the indicators of corruption they use as a basic input in their indices and the methodological choices that go into the making of their indices. been used regularly in corruption research since the mid-1990s, either directly or indirectly, when these indicators are used in indices. But they have not been analyzed and/or compared empirically in much depth. Thus, we start our evaluation of corruption data by considering a set of indicators that are routinely interpreted as corruption measures.
One central methodological difference in the way that data on indicators are generated concerns who evaluates a country's level of corruption. After all, the indicators we consider rely on responses to questions by evaluators and, using characteristics of the evaluator as the criterion of classification, it is possible to distinguish among five classes of sources of data on corruption indicators-classes of indicators, for short: Those that rely on i) expert ratings by a commercial risk assessment agency, ii) expert ratings by an NGO, iii) expert ratings by a multilateral development bank (MDB), iv) surveys of business executives, and v) surveys of the mass public (for a classification of indicators, see the note accompanying Table 1 ). It is important therefore to test whether the results of the measurement process are unrelated to the characteristics of the evaluator, a basic principle of scientific measurement, or, alternatively, whether there are grounds for arguing that a variable feature of the measurement instruments-their reliance on different evaluators-as opposed to actual differences in corruption, affects measures of corruption. Table   1 ): Different classes of indicators yield measures that vary significantly in terms of their strictness, that is, whether they tend to systematically generate higher or lower estimates of the level of corruption in countries around the world. Specifically, only the data generated by expert ratings by MDBs and surveys of the mass public are indistinguishable. 3 The literature on this question has been ambiguous. Though some authors have played down the divergence among measures of corruption produced by different classes of indicators (Treisman 2000: 412, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a: 556-57) , others have noted the difference between classes of indicators, emphasizing in particularly the contrast between common citizens and other respondents (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2006: 21-23, Kurtz and Schrank 2007b: 566) .
But the finding is even stronger. The relationship among the five classes of indicators follows a highly structured pattern, whereby each class of indicator can be ordered, in descending order of strictness, as follows:
Expert Commercial > Expert NGO > Business Survey > Expert MDB = Mass Survey
This is a striking pattern, which does not seem consistent with random measurement error. This pattern is evidence that a country's assessed level of corruption is affected by who conducts the assessment, as some evaluators are distinguishably stricter or more lenient than others. Different evaluators have, in general, different standards.
To gain a sense of the magnitude of the difference that can be interpreted as systematic measurement error, it is useful to compare the level of variability that is attributable to these different classes of evaluators as opposed to subjective measures in general, that is, measures that rely on judgments made by people in response to certain questions. It could very well be the case that all subjective measures are highly unreliable, and hence that these differences-though indicating a problem in the measurement of corruption-are suggestive of random error. Yet the evidence is not encouraging. A reasonable estimate of the level of variation that can be expected from subjective measures of corruption is between 1.5 and 3.0% of the overall variation in an indicator scale. 4 In contrast, the differences in these data on corruption, again relative to the overall variation in the indicator scales, reaches as high as 14.7% in the case of the global comparison between expert ratings by commercial risk assessment agencies and the expert ratings by MDBs (see Table 1 ). The differences in the corruption scores of different classes of indicators are not minor.
We next considered whether the difference in standards across evaluators hold consistently across countries. We compared the regional means relative to the global mean of each class of indicator, again calculating these mean values using paired comparisons of all countries for which data from the two classes of indicators are available, and sought to ascertain whether any class of indicator assesses any region according to stricter or more lenient standards than it treats all cases in the world on average. And, again, the results of the empirical analysis were revealing (see Table 2 ).
4 This baseline figure was calculated by comparing the mean values on 16 governance variables (one of them being corruption) for 2005 that were coded by expert raters of three multilateral development banks (the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank) using a common set of guidelines (the CPIA framework). For the framework, see World Bank (2005) (2006) . Through this comparison, we are able to hold the class of respondent constant and hence assess the range of variability that might be due solely to the fact that measures are assigned by experts, as well as to consider whether subjective measures of corruption are different from subjective measures of other governance indicators. The overall difference between the mean of the scores assigned both by the World Bank and the African Development Bank on the 15 variables (excluding corruption) was 1.3% (p = 0.000, N = 585), with the World Bank assigning the lower scores on average. The difference between scores assigned both by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank on the 16 variables was 2.2% (p = 0.000, N = 285), the lower mean corresponding again to the World Bank. The overall difference between the mean of the scores of the corruption variable was 3.0% (p = 0.032, N = 39) when the coding was done by the World Bank and the African Development Bank, and 2.2% (p = 0.135, N = 19) when the coding was done by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Thus, it seems that a band of variability between 1.5 and 3.0% in mean values might be expected from subjective measures. Recapitulating, the answer to the question, Does the evaluator make a difference? must be answered affirmatively. As the analysis of indicators shows, a substantial amount of the variation in reported levels of corruption is not attributable to variation in actual corruption or to random measurement error but, rather, is driven by the choice of evaluator and hence is an artifact of the method selected to measure corruption. Different evaluators use different standards in evaluating levels of corruption and, complicating matters further, the difference in standards across evaluators does not hold consistently across countries. 6 As a result, if someone was displeased with the way some indicator depicted the level of corruption in a certain country, this person could search among the many existing indicators until they found an indicator that offered a measure more to their liking. Moreover, the basis for stating that disagreements among evaluators can be adjudicated, by arguing that some indicators are more valid than others and hence that the conclusions drawn from these indicators are more credible, is far from apparent.
An inescapable conclusion is that the measurement of corruption includes an element of arbitrariness.
II. The Weighting of Classes of Indicators in Corruption Indices
One response to concerns about the quality of indicators on corruption has been the construction of indices that combine many of these indicators. The argument, briefly, is that, by combining the indicators, the measurement error of the individual indicators is reduced. 
II. i. The Choice of Indicators
Both the CCI and the CPI are constructed on the basis of a large number of sources that provide data on indicators. In recent years, the CCI has been based on approximately two dozen such sources (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2008: 78) , while the CPI has been based on roughly one dozen (Lambsdorff 2008: 2, 12-13) . In general terms, the criterion for selection of data sources used by the developers of the CCI is to rely on as many data sources as possible (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2008: 4) , even when they might not be measures of corruption per se; in contrast, the developer of the CPI is more selective, paying more attention to whether the sources actually measure corruption as opposed to some other, potentially associated concept (Lambsdorff 2007: 238-40 ). Nonetheless, a major concern for the developers of both the CCI and the CPI is to cover most countries of the world and to rely on multiple sources on each country, 8 and for this reason the selection of data sources is driven largely by considerations of convenience, that is, whether data sources covering different countries are available.
The consequences of this sampling of data sources largely by convenience are clear. As the distribution of the classes of indicators over time (see Table 3 ) and across regions of the world (see Table 4 ) shows, there is a striking lack of balance in the proportion of different classes of indicators used in both the CCI and the CPI. First, there is considerable variation in terms of the percentage of each class of indicators used on average by each index. In the CCI, the expert ratings by commercial risk agencies are the dominant class of indicator; in the CPI, the expert ratings by commercial risk agencies and the surveys of business executives practically overwhelm the other three classes of indicators (see the rows for "All Years" in Table 3 ).
Second, there is considerable variation in terms of the reliance by each index on different classes of indicators over time. In the CCI, the relative number of expert ratings by commercial risk agencies declines markedly over time, as does the expert ratings by MDBs, while the relative number of expert ratings by NGOs and surveys of the mass public increases; in the CPI, the relative number of surveys of business executives declines very markedly over time, while the relative number of expert ratings by commercial risk agencies and the expert ratings by NGOs and MDBs increases (see Table 3 ). Third, the relative number of different classes of indicators varies considerably on average, that is, over all the years considered, across regions (see Table   4 ). (2) what is the relationship among the indicator values being aggregated? With regard to the second question, both the CCI and the CPI rely on an additive aggregation rule. This is a standard default option, which largely makes sense in this context. In particular, since the developers of the CCI and the CPI posit that each indicator they aggregate is simply a different measure of the same concept, as opposed to say a part of a whole, the use of an additive aggregation rule is a relatively uncontentious matter. With regard to the first question, the CCI and the CPI proceed differently. The CCI relies on a transformation of all the indicator values into normalized scores using a 0-1 scale, a fairly standard if not entirely justified procedure. In contrast, the CPI is based on the more modest rule of relying only on the information about ordinal differences captured by the indicator values (Lambsdorff 2008: 6) . However, from the perspective of our analysis, this difference has little impact. Thus, we focus solely on the question of weighting of indicators. For a detailed discussion of aggregation procedures, see Lambsdorff (2006b: 88-97; 2008: 6-8) on the CPI, and Mastruzzi (2004: 258-61, 2008: 13-16, 97-102) on the CCI.
The CPI uses a simple average of all the indicators used for each country-year and thus formally assigns equal weight to each of the available indicators (Lambsdorff 2006b: 97) .
However, because the class of indicators used in the CPI vary considerably over time and across countries (see Table 3 Second, and more fundamentally, the unobserved component model assumes that more highly correlated indicators should be assigned a greater weight because such indicators offer truer values. But this assumption can be questioned both on methodological and empirical grounds. Methodologically, the assumption is flawed because it mistakenly uses a test of the reliability of data as a test of validity or, in other words, consensus for truth. Interpreting correlations between measures as evidence of validity of these measures confuses the concept of validity and reliability. Validity concerns the relationship between a concept and its measure and thus must inevitably call for references back to the abstract concept that is purportedly being measured, whereas reliability focuses on the level of agreement among multiple measures but does not distinguish among reliably correct measures and reliably incorrect measures.
In turn, empirical tests also caution against the use of the unobserved component model. In short, the CCI's more complex approach to the weighting of indicators not only does nothing to counteract the problem that the CCI is based, first of all, on indicators that contain systematic measurement error. Furthermore, the CCI's formal weighting scheme actually 12 As Table 3 shows, the most frequently used classes of indicators in the CCI are, in descending order, the expert ratings by commercial risk assessment agencies, the expert ratings by MDBs, the surveys of business executives, the expert ratings by NGOs, and the surveys of the mass public. In turn, the average level of correlation between any single indicator of a certain class of source indicator and all other indicators, a gauge of the level of agreement among indicators, is as follows: expert ratings by commercial risk assessment agencies = 0.552, expert ratings by MDBs = 0.425, surveys of business executives = 0.526, expert ratings by NGOs = 0.373, and surveys of the mass public = 0.323. Thus, to a large extent, the most frequently used classes of sources indicators are also more highly compounds the imbalance in the distribution of data sources across the different classes of indicators due to the selection of indicators. Hence, the CCI's weighting scheme is even more problematic than the simpler weighting scheme adopted by the CPI.
II. iii. The Impact of Alternative Weightings of Classes of Indicators
The effect of the choice of indicators and the choice of aggregation procedure on the validity of the CCI and the CPI cannot be quantified. Such an estimate would require knowledge of the true level of corruption around the world, which is precisely the aim of work on measurement. But we can isolate variation in the values of the CCI and the CPI that is due solely to a methodological choice, the variable weights they assign to different classes of sources both through the choice of indicators and the choice of aggregation procedure. And such an assessment of the impact of alternative weights of classes of indicators is instructive.
To this end, we devised the following test. First, we used the data on country-year for which indicators of all five classes of sources are available to calculate an average value for indicators of each class of source. The results of this test are telling. A comparison of the means of the different indices shows that differences in weighting schemes are not irrelevant. The mean values of indices using the CCI's and the CPI's weighting scheme, as would be expected from the relatively larger weight they assign to evaluators that are stricter on average (see Tables 1 and 3) , are significantly lower than the mean value of an index that assigns an equal weight to the five classes of indicators identified in this paper (see Table 5 ). 15 Of course, the lower means could be the more accurate measure. But, in the absence of firm evidence that certain classes of indicators are more valid than others, there is no theoretical reason to give certain classes of indicators more weight than others. 16 Thus, this result shows that the values of the CPI, and even more so those of the CCI, diverge from the most reasonable weighting of indicators we can currently make.
17
15 The mean value of an index is simply the average of the values of the five classes of indicators. 16 This point has been made by Knack (2007: 268-69) . 17 The deleterious impact of the CCI's reliance on the unobserved component model in particular is obvious when an index using the full CCI weighting is compared to an index that averages the values of the indicators used by the CCI and hence drops the extra weighting introduced via the unobserved component model. The index with a simple weighting has an average of 0.405, standard deviation of 0.032, a minimum deviation from the mean of -0.055 and a maximum deviation from the mean of 0.095. In other words, by aggregating indicators using the unobserved component model the CCI is more unbalanced than if indicators were aggregated using a simple averaging formula. 18 In turn, the lack of a consistent weighing scheme on the part of the CCI and the CPI leads to systematic fictitious differences across the main world regions, the magnitude of these differences being larger in the case of the index using the CCI's weights (see Figures 1 and   2 ). In short, the construction of the CCI and the CPI lacks a solid theoretical justification-it seems to place the desire to cover the largest number of countries possible above key methodological considerations-and induces bias in the CCI and CPI data that seriously undermines their usefulness in comparing levels of corruption across countries and over time.
19
18 Both difference of means are significant at a 0.0000 level. The N for the index with CCI weights is 182 per year; for the index with CPI weights the N is 80 per year. 19 It may seem surprising that a test reported by the developers of the CCI shows that the values of the CCI are robust to changes in the weighting scheme and, specifically, that an index using the weighting scheme chosen for the CCI is very highly correlated to one that gives equal weight to different classes of indicators. Specifically, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007c: 21-22 ) report correlations for all six World Governance Indicators, of which the Control of Corruption Index is one, and state that the correlation between an index using their weighting scheme and one that weights each class of indicator equally is approximately 0.95. But a simple analysis of correlations does not constitute an adequate test of the impact of these different weighting schemes on the data on corruption provided by the World Bank or Transparency International for a simple reason. An index that gives equal weight to different classes of indicators must, perforce, be limited to those countries for which all classes of indicators are available. And precisely because all classes of indicators are available for these countries, the weight of each of class of indicators will be more balanced in these countries than in the countries that are not used in the correlational analysis. In short, such a test has to rely on a subset of cases that is not representative of the entire Note: This graphic shows the methods-induced deviations in corruption scores that result from differences across countries in the weighting of classes of indicators. To illustrate these methods-induced deviations in corruption scores, we begin by assuming that the corruption experience in all countries is homogenous and assigning each country the same score for any indicator of the same class of indicator. These scores are the actual mean value of indicator of a certain class for all countries that have indicators of all five classes of sources (see footnote 13 for more details). We then calculate the CCI index score for each country, using the list of indicator used in the CCI and the indicator weights provided by the World Bank. The heavy dashed line indicates the mean score across all countries. If there were no methods-induced deviations in scores, there would be no variation across countries, and all scores would align on the heavy dashed line, which represents the global mean of 0.396. Deviations from this mean show how much a country's score is shifted upward or downward due to the variable weighting of classes of indicators. Countries with deviations that fall above the mean line benefit from methods-induced improvements to their corruption scores; countries that fall below the mean line, suffer a methods-induced decrease in their corruption scores. These box plots show that the size of the methodsinduced deviations in corruption scores differs by region. For a list of the countries included in each region, see Appendix 2.
Source: Authors' calculations based a data set constructed from World Bank (2009a). population, and hence does not offer an adequate estimate of the impact of different weighting schemes on the CCI or CPI data. 
III. Implications of the State of Corruption Measures for Future Research
Efforts to measure corruption, and especially to develop cross-national data sets of broad scope, are unquestionably welcome and laudable. Corruption is a key problem that directly undermines democracy and good government. And part of the challenge of understanding the nature of corruption, as well as its causes and consequences, is the development of measures of corruption. Thus, it is always worth remembering that having some data, even if of poor quality, is a less grave problem than having no data at all. Yet the current availability of multiple indicators and a few indices on corruption has given rise to a new problem, that different measurement methodologies produce different measures of corruption and, as shown, that a substantial amount of the variation in reported levels of corruption is an artifact of the methodologies used to generate the data as opposed to variation in actual levels of corruption. This is a sobering conclusion, which has several implications both for data users and producers.
Implications for Data Users. For users of data, the most generic advice that can be offered is that, in light of the finding that the choice of data set has a considerable impact on the results of quantitative, cross-national studies on corruption, researchers need to pay more attention to data matters. As shown, different datasets support divergent descriptions of the world. And, unsurprisingly, different data sets support different findings about the causes and consequences of corruption. Indeed, our review of 76 articles published in 19 highly regarded economics journals between 1995 and 2009 20 reveals that when hypotheses were tested with multiple data sets on corruption, even though these data sets were not always independent ones (i.e. they are indices that use the same data sources), the coefficient changed sign in 28% of the tests and the magnitude of the key coefficient varied considerably in many of the other cases. We also found that the strength of statistical conclusions were very sensitive to choice of data set: the significance level of the coefficients changed (crossing either the 5% or the 10% threshold) in 60% of the tests. . 21 In 47% of the cases the results were above and below the 5% threshold of significance, and in 37% of the cases the results were above and below the 10% threshold of significance. Since some of the articles include tests of more than one research question, these percentages are based on the total number of research questions that are tested. shows that only 39% of authors who used corruption data sets performed a sensitivity analysis in which a hypothesis was tested using more than one data set. In turn, a sensitivity analysis that both held constant the specification of the model and relied on partly or fully independently generated data sets was offered in only 25% of the reviewed articles. 22 Thus, along with emphasizing the need for sensitivity analyses, it is key to stress that the data sets included in such an analysis should be independent data sources and, preferably, should draw on data sources on at least two of the five classes of indicators identified in this paper, that is, expert ratings by commercial risk assessment agencies, by NGOs and by MDBs, and surveys of business executives and the mass public. 24 Indeed, even when critics of the developers of the CCI have pointed out their failure to clearly distinguish these two concepts (Kurtz and Schrank 2007b: 564) , their response does not even acknowledge the point (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007b) . Nonetheless, the developer of the CPI also confuses the concepts of validity and reliability quite often. An illustrative example is when Lambsdorff (2006b: 87) , after considering the correlation among various indicators, states that "The validity of the sources is mutually confirmed." 25 For example, the developer of the CPI, Lambsdorff (2006b: 83-84) admits that the CPI is not well suited for overtime comparisons. In contrast, the developers of the CCI reject out of hand the value of any criticism of the CCI Mastruzzi 2007c, Kaufmann and Kraay 2008: 21-22) .
Authors' calculations based on the Hawken and Munck Data Set on Corruption Research in Economics Journals
comparison between the CPI and the CCI. A sensitivity analysis using both the CPI and the CCI suffers the problem that both indices use many of the same indicators and hence are not really independent measures of corruption (indeed, the shortcomings of sensitivity analyses that use one of these indices and one of the indicators included in the selected index should also be recognized). Thus, researchers must weight the convenience of ready accessibility to data on a large number of countries-undoubtedly the key selling point of the CPI and the CCI-against the important limitations of these measures.
Implications for Data Producers.
It is important to recognize that efforts to generate new measures and to improve the quality of data on corruption are an integral part of corruptionoriented research. One relatively easy way to improve on the available measures of corruption is to develop a superior index from the available data on indicators. A clear advance would be made by generating an index that better addresses the two key methodological choices raised in this paper-the choice of indicators and aggregation procedure-and that is based on choices guided both by theory and empirical tests. Such an index would perforce be narrower in empirical scope than the CPI and the CCI if it required balance among the classes of indicators used for each country. Yet it may well be preferable to test theories about the causes and consequences of corruption with a smaller N than is provided by the CPI and the CCI but with greater certainty about the validity of the data.
A more burdensome task concerns the generation of data on new indicators. In this regard, the measurement literature has emphasized the need to develop "objective" or hard measures as opposed to the "subjective" or soft measures of corruption based on evaluators. The distinction between objective and subjective measures of corruption is relevant, in that research has shown that these two classes of measures produce divergent assessments (Mocan 2008 , Donchev and Ujhelyi 2009 , Olken 2009 ). Moreover, one clear advantage of objective measures is that they avoid a potential critique of subjective measures, that evaluators assess the level of corruption in a country at least in part based on suspected causes and consequences of corruption, such as poverty and economic growth, instead of corruption itself. 26 Thus, the steps taken to develop "objective," experience-based measures of corruption by a number of researchers is a welcome development.
27
It is important to recognize that the development of "objective" corruption measures for the purpose of cross-national comparison is a daunting task. On the other hand, it is critical not to underestimate the potential of subjective measures of corruption. The contrast between objective and subjective measures is frequently exaggerated, and subjective measures are essentially equated with perceptions of corruption. So-called subjective measures may tap solely into perception, but they can also be carefully grounded in observables and even meet the basic criteria of replicability. Thus, future research on corruption will best be served by various classes of measures of corruption and by judiciously pooling the information from these different measures.
28
The challenges discussed in this paper are not limited to research on corruption. To be sure, corruption is a notoriously hard concept to measure. But many key concepts in political science and economics-such as democracy, human rights, justice, rule of law, state capacity, and development-are similarly hard to measure. And much of the data used in research on these topics are based, as in the case of corruption, on evaluations by a range of respondents, be they experts or common citizens, and thus are face the same problems found in measures of corruption. Indeed, measures of these concepts will, for the foreseeable future, be affected by the problem that evaluators rely on different standards of assessment and furthermore do not apply standards consistently across cases. 29 Thus, the question we address in this paper-does the evaluator make a difference?-has broad implications for the knowledge claims made in the social sciences.
27 See Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) , Reinikka and Svensson (2004) , Golden and Picci (2005) , Hsieh and Moretti (2006), and Olken (2007) . 28 To improve the quality of subjective measures, greater attention has to be given to the way in which questionnaires are written and administered. Questions should focus more on specifics and actual observations. Moreover, it is important not to ask people about things they really do not know about (for example, asking common citizens about grand corruption seems like an invitation to speculation) and to do more to tap into the knowledge of people who do have useful information (for example, by posing questions to people who work within government ministries). For an example of data gathered through a survey of ministries administered in Georgia, see Hawken and Kulick (2006) . For an instrument, designed for Afghanistan, that uses a survey of ministries, and combines it with other sources of information, see Hawken and Munck (2008) . Finally, for an instrument to generate crossnational measures using different sources of information, see Hawken and Munck (2009) . 29 For some evidence of a "coder factor" in measures of democracy, see Munck (2009: 77-79 ).
